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Abstract—Fingerprint presentation attack detection is becoming an increasingly challenging problem due to the continuous
advancement of attack preparation techniques, which generate realistic-looking fake fingerprint presentations. In this work, rather than
relying on legacy fingerprint images, which are widely used in the community, we study the usefulness of multiple recently introduced
sensing modalities. Our study covers front-illumination imaging using short-wave-infrared, near-infrared, and laser illumination; and
back-illumination imaging using near-infrared light. Toward studying the effectiveness of our data, we conducted a comprehensive
analysis using a fully convolutional deep neural network framework. We performed our evaluations on two large datasets collected at
different sites. For examining the effects of changing the training and testing sets, a 3-fold cross-validation evaluation was followed.
Moreover, the effect of the presence of unseen attacks is studied by using a leave-one-out cross-validation evaluation over different
attributes of the utilized presentation attack instruments. To assess the effectiveness of the studied sensing modalities compared to
legacy data, we applied the same classification framework on legacy images collected for the same participants in one of our collection
sites and achieved improved performance. Furthermore, the proposed classification framework was applied on the LivDet2015 dataset
and outperformed existing state-of-the-art algorithms. This indicates that the power of our approach stems from the nature of the
captured data rather than just the employed classification framework. Therefore, the extra cost for hardware-based (or hybrid) solutions
is justifiable by its superior performance, especially for high security applications. One of the dataset collections used in this study will
be publicly released upon the acceptance of this manuscript.
Index Terms—Fingerprint Biometrics, Presentation Attack Detection, Multi-Spectral Imaging, Short-Wave Infrared, Convolutional
Neural Networks.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
B IOMETRIC authentication systems provide additionalsecurity and convenience as well as reduced cost, com-
pared to conventional authentication methods. As a result,
their use is widespread in different application domains,
including law-enforcement or border and access control, for
government, corporate or personal purposes. Nevertheless,
such systems can be vulnerable to different types of attacks
targeting different points of the underlying authentication
pipeline. Arguably, the most vulnerable component of a
biometric authentication system is the biometric sensor
itself, due to the public accessibility of sensors, in many
cases. An attack on a biometric sensor typically constitutes
the presentation of a fake sample in order to either (1)
impersonate a legitimate user or (2) conceal the true identity
of a black-listed one. Automatic detection of this type of
presentation attack (PA) has attracted significant research
interest with a myriad of presentation attack detection (PAD)
methods applied on different biometric modalities, such as
fingerprint, iris or face [1]. However, due to the continuous
advent of realistic presentation attack instruments (PAIs), PAD
is still an increasingly challenging problem.
Fingerprint is perhaps the first modality to be used for
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biometric authentication, and hence, has been thoroughly
studied by the biometrics and computer vision communi-
ties [2]. Despite its wide acceptability as a universal, distinc-
tive, and permanent biometric characteristic [3], presenta-
tion attacks have been shown to successfully spoof finger-
print authentication systems [4], [5]. As a result, significant
research work has been devoted to address the problem of
fingerprint presentation attack detection (FPAD) [6], [7].
FPAD methods can be categorized into software-only or
hybrid, based on the components they add to the biometric
authentication system. Software-only or software-based tech-
niques, which are the most abundant in the literature, only
add a software module to augment existing fingerprint
authentication systems with PAD functionality. Hence, they
solely depend on the data used for enrollment and recogni-
tion to perform FPAD. Examples of software-based techniques
include [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14]. On the contrary,
hybrid or hardware-based techniques employ additional hard-
ware for FPAD along with the hardware used for fingerprint
sensing. We refer to them as hybrid techniques since they still
involve software modules that process the data captured by
the additional sensing hardware to deliver FPAD function-
ality. Examples of hybrid techniques include [15], [16], [17].
Software-only FPAD techniques have attracted more in-
terest in the research community owing to their cost-
effectiveness and direct applicability on publicly available
datasets. Nonetheless, we argue that hybrid techniques
should gain more attention for the following reasons:
• Authentication and PAD are two fundamentally dif-
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Fig. 1. A biometric authentication system with a hybrid fingerprint pre-
sentation attack detection (FPAD) subsystem.
ferent problems. Hence, restricting them to rely on
the same sensing hardware limits the progress that
could be attained in each.
• With the continuous evolution of sophisticated PA
techniques and the attackers’ deeper understanding
of the intrinsics of biometric authentication, it is
becoming increasingly challenging to rely on a sin-
gle sensing technology for both authentication and
PAD. In fact, it has been shown that each of the
major fingerprint sensing technologies (e.g., optical,
capacitive or thermal) is vulnerable to at least one
type of material used for PAIs (e.g., gelatin, silicone
or glycerin) [18], [19], [20], [21].
• Not only attack fabrication technology improves but
also the effect of attacks is becoming more devastat-
ing, especially when a single successful attack can be
used to impersonate multiple individuals at the same
time [22], [23]. Consequently, especially for security
critical applications, the additional hardware cost of
hybrid approaches is well justified.
• Hybrid PAD techniques can enhance the reliability
of a biometric authentication system. Consider the
system illustrated in Fig. 1 which employs a hybrid
PAD subsystem with a parallel matching branch
(similar to the one introduced in [24]). In this de-
sign, the separation between the matching and PAD
pipelines enhances security since an attacker would
have to simultaneously compromise both processing
pipelines to succeed. Such task is more challenging
compared to the single-point attacks typically found
in software-only PAD approaches [25].
In this paper, we focus on hybrid techniques and evaluate
a number of recently introduced sensing modalities for
FPAD against legacy data from fingerprint authentication
systems. Specifically, we investigate the performance of
a novel fully-convolutional neural network (FCN) model
for FPAD on images captured under different illumination
conditions, namely:
1) Visible (VIS) and near-infrared (NIR), denoted to-
gether as FM .
2) Short-wave-infrared (SWIR), denoted as FS .
3) Laser speckle contrast imaging (LSCI), denoted as FL.
4) Near-infrared back-illumination, denoted as BN .
In this notation, the letter F stands for front-illumination-
based sensing, in which the illumination source and the
CameraLED
(a) Front-illumination.
Camera
LED
(b) Back-illumination.
Fig. 2. Front vs. Back Illumination
camera are on the same side with respect to the finger; and
the letter B stands for back-illumination-based sensing, in
which the illumination source and the camera are on two
opposite sides of the finger. The two types of illumination
are illustrated in Fig. 2. The subscripts in the aforementioned
notation refer to the type of illumination used. To assess
the value of hybrid techniques, the performance of our
FPAD model using these modalities – individually or in
different combinations with one another – is compared to
the performance of the same model on legacy fingerprint
images, used in software-only techniques. We will refer to the
unconventional sensing modalities data as prototype data.
The performance evaluation in this paper is conducted
over a new large dataset, named Presentation Attack Detec-
tion from Information Sciences Institute (PADISI). PADISI
includes data from three different biometric modalities:
fingerprint, face, and iris that were collected using the
developed system in [26]. In this paper, we only study
the fingerprint portion, which we will refer to as PADISI-
Finger. PADISI was collected at two different sites. The
first site is the University Park Campus of the University
of Southern California (USC), in Los Angeles, California
while the second is in Columbia, Maryland in a facility
of the Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) of John Hopkins
University. The data at the two sites were collected using
two different replicas of the system in [26]. Additionally,
the APL collection included legacy fingerprint data collected
via a number of commercial fingerprint sensors. Most of
the analysis in this paper is done on the USC data. This
dataset will become publicly available upon the acceptance
of this manuscript. The APL collection is used for inter-site
evaluation and for comparison with legacy data. The public
release of the APL data is beyond the control of the authors
in this work.
The work presented in this paper builds on top of our
prior work [27], [28], with the following additional notable
contributions:
• This is the first study that analyzes the PAD ca-
pabilities of unconventional sensing modalities for
fingerprint compared to legacy data. Our results
highlight the power of the studied sensing modalities
in tackling different types of attacks.
• The SWIR and LSCI data in the new datasets have
significantly higher resolution (∼ 192 ppi – pixels
per inch) compared to the data used in our prior
3work [27], [28]. The resolution in the old data was
only ∼ 35 for SWIR and ∼ 135 for LSCI.
• Our evaluation covers each unconventional modality
individually as well as their combinations and com-
pares all that to the performance on legacy data. Such
thorough analysis provides valuable information to
practitioners on the complementary nature among
groups of sensing modalities and their power in
comparison to legacy data.
• We employ a novel FCN model, which is more effi-
cient and more powerful than our prior patch-based
convolutional neural network (CNN) models [27],
[28]. To validate the effectiveness of this model, we
present its evaluation on the LivDet2015 dataset [29]
achieving superior performance to state-of-the-art.
• Our evaluation protocols cover a wide spectrum
of scenarios. We use 3-fold cross-validation on the
USC collection to assess the power of different sens-
ing modalities. Additionally, we follow an inter-
collection evaluation (training on USC and testing
on APL data) to assess the effect of changes in demo-
graphic and PAI distributions. Finally, we follow a
leave-one-attack-category out cross-validation to as-
sess the performance on completely unseen attacks.
• The data collected at USC will be publicly released
upon the acceptance of this manuscript, which con-
stitutes a valuable asset to the research community.
To our knowledge, this will be the first public dataset
covering such a broad range of sensing modalities
for FPAD. The dataset is relatively large and covers a
wide range of PAI species.
1.1 Related Work
Aside from alteration detection, in which the focus is on de-
tecting a physical alteration to a real finger for the purpose
of hiding real identity, FPAD methods typically attempt
to find characteristics in the input presentation that can
distinguish a live finger from a dead or fake one [7]. This
explains why these methods are collectively referred to as
liveness detection [7].
Numerous proposed approaches are based on physio-
logical characteristics of the finger that are directly sensed
as part of the biometric authentication system. These charac-
teristics can be either static or dynamic. Static characteristics,
such as odor [16], skin resistance [30], [31], perspiration [32],
and internal finger structure measured by optical coher-
ence tomography (OCT) [17], [33], [34], [35], are typically
extracted from a single image of the fingerprint. Other
methods exploit multiple images to extract static character-
istics, such as techniques based on multi-spectral imaging
(MSI) [36], [37], [38], [39], [40], [41], [42] or multi-view
imaging [43]. On the other hand, dynamic characteristics
are derived by nature when processing multiple fingerprint
images, e.g., a time series of images to measure finger
distortion and elasticity [13], [44], heartbeat [14] or blood
flow [45], [46].
Most of the aforementioned approaches are hybrid tech-
niques since they involve additional hardware components
for detecting certain physiological characteristics. However,
the distinction between bona-fides and attacks may not only
rely on the lack of liveness-related physiological attributes
but also on the existence of artifacts on a fake fingerprint,
stemming from its fabrication process. Consequently, most
software-only techniques attempt to differentiate between
bona-fide and attack samples based on pattern recognition
and signal processing techniques without making the dis-
tinction between liveness detection or artifact detection.
Traditionally, software-only FPAD methods apply con-
ventional classification techniques (e.g., support vector ma-
chines - SVMs) using hand-crafted features such as wavelet
and gray level co-occurrence matrix of optical images [8],
[47], [48], [49], histogram and binarized statistical image fea-
tures [50], [51], [52], scale-invariant feature descriptors [53],
Weber local descriptor [54], frequency domain informa-
tion [55], and pore location distribution [56].
More recently, many software-only FPAD approaches
have been proposed utilizing CNNs [57], [58], [59], [60].
Nogueira et al. [58] fine-tuned AlexNet [61] and VGG [62]
architectures to perform liveness detection of fingerprints.
A classical CNN consisting of four 2D convolutional layers
with a binary cross-entropy loss was used by Wang et
al. [63]. Bhanu et al. [64] used triplet loss in their network to
minimize the intra-class distances of the patches belonging
to the same class while maximizing the inter-class distances.
Chugh et al. [65], [66], [67] used MobileNet-v1 over the
centered and aligned patches extracted around fingerprint
minutiae to discriminate between fake and real fingerprints
of optical images. Park et al. [68] included fire and gram
modules within their network to learn the textures of bona-
fide and PA samples. Kim et al. [69] employed deep belief
networks and used contrastive divergence for FPAD.
There exist few CNN-based hybrid techniques for FPAD.
For instance, recently, CNN models were used with
LSCI [27], [28], [70] and SWIR [36], [42] imaging. MSI-based
hybrid techniques are particularly relevant to our research.
MSI can reveal distinguishing characteristics of real human
skin compared to a multitude of materials used to create
fingerprint PAs. In the simplest form of MSI, multiple
images of a given target are captured while the target is
actively illuminated by different wavelengths in each frame.
Each wavelength exhibits varying penetration, absorption
and reflection properties for different materials. These phe-
nomena can be utilized in distinguishing real human skin
from other materials. Row et al. first introduced MSI to
fingerprint image acquisition in [38] but all wavelengths
were in the visible spectrum; specifically 430nm-630nm and
white. Response to visible spectrum illumination signifi-
cantly varies between different skin tones, which limits its
utility for FPAD. Very limited applications of MSI in FPAD
beyond the visible domain exist, such as the work on the
visible and near infrared spectrum (i.e., 400nm-850nm) [71],
and on the visible to SWIR regimes (400nm-1650nm), whose
dynamic characteristics were investigated as a means of
distinguishing live fingers from cadavers [40]. In both [71]
and [40], very few samples were used. In this paper, we
present the most comprehensive study of MSI on FPAD. Not
only, our study covers wavelengths in the broad range VIS-
SWIR, but also includes front, back, LED-based and laser-
based illumination. Furthermore, we use relatively large
datasets containing a wide variety of attacks.
4TABLE 1
Overview of collected data per finger by the utilized finger biometric sensor suite.
Camera VIS/NIR [72] - 1282× 1026 pixels - 12 bits (stored as 16) SWIR [73] - 320× 256 pixels - 16 bits
Sensing Modality FM BN FS FL
Illumination white 465nm 591nm 720nm 780nm 870nm 940nm 940nm 1200nm 1300nm 1450nm 1550nm 1310nm [74]
Illuminated
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 20 1 1 1 1 100Frames
Non-Illuminated
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 − 4 4 4 4 −Frames
2 FINGER BIOMETRICS SYSTEM DESIGN
The utilized finger biometrics sensor suite has been im-
proved and simplified compared to its previous version
in [27]. In this section, we provide a brief overview of
the system focusing on the rationale for using the selected
sensing modalities, supported by relevant literature. The
interested reader can refer to [26] for more technical details
about the design, selected hardware components and its
operation. The schematic diagram of the system is shown
in Fig. 3. A finger is placed on the slit and is illuminated
from the bottom side (front-illumination) by multi-spectral
LEDs and a laser as well as the top side (back-illumination)
by NIR LEDs while being observed by two cameras from a
distance of∼ 35cm. Each camera is sensitive to the VIS/NIR
or the SWIR spectrum, respectively. The sensor is touch-less
in the sense that no platen covers the finger slit.
Each chosen sensing modality in our station provides in-
dicative information for either the liveness of a presentation
or the presence of a fabrication artifact, as follows:
• Front VIS/NIR illumination (FM ) data: NIR multi-
spectral images can provide ample information
about the spectral and textural characteristics of the
material of a presentation [71]. Further, they can be
used as legacy compatible data, as shown in [26].
• Front SWIR illumination (FS) data: Human skin has
a distinctive response in the SWIR spectrum that is
independent of skin tone. In a recent study, con-
ducted by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), the variability of skin response
due to differences among people was found to be
less significant than the variability due to instru-
ment characteristics only beyond the 1100nm wave-
length [75]. The same observation was confirmed in a
successful application of PAD using MSI in the SWIR
domain, for face biometrics [76], and more recently,
using the previous version of our data, on fingerprint
biometrics [27], [36], [42], [77], [78].
• Front LSCI (FL) data: When laser light illuminates a
surface, a random interference pattern, known as the
speckle pattern, is formed. The pattern is affected
by the roughness and/or temperature of the surface
and appears static for stationary objects. However,
the pattern changes over time when there is motion
on the illuminated object, such as the movement of
blood cells under the skin surface. In fact, blood
perfusion in a tissue can be visualized [79] using
LSCI by collecting a sequence of images. Therefore,
LSCI measurements can constitute a useful liveness
signal for FPAD. LSCI has attracted very little at-
tention in the FPAD literature despite its interesting
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Fig. 3. Finger biometric sensor suite. See [26] for more technical details.
properties. Chatterjee et al. [80] conducted a study on
the hardware and physics of LSCI and showed that
there is significant difference between the biospeckle
patterns of bona-fide and fake fingers. However, the
study involved a very small dataset and did not ac-
tually evaluate FPAD performance. Using data from
the previous version of our system [27], Keilbach et
al. [50], [70] performed LSCI-based FPAD by apply-
ing classical classification algorithms (e.g., SVMs), on
a set of hand crafted features, such as intensity his-
tograms or LBP features. Later on, Hussein et al. [27]
and Mirzaalian et al. [28] utilized various spatio-
temporal neural networks to perform LSCI-based
FPAD which demonstrated promising performance.
• Back NIR illumination (BN ) data: The internal vas-
cular pattern of a hand can be visualized using NIR
illumination [71], [81]. In the presence of a finger
between a light source and a camera, the collected
image intensities represent the amount of light pen-
etrating through the sample, as compared to front-
illumination which measures the reflected light, in-
stead [81]. Vessel structures appear darker since light
is absorbed by the hemoglobin in the blood and can
be used as an indicator of liveness for FPAD. Back-
illuminated NIR images from our previous dataset
were used for FPAD in [82].
It is worth noting that select combinations of the sensing
modalities were already studied on the previous version
of our dataset, as in [27], [53], [78], [83]. In this study, we
evaluate FPAD performance on our new dataset using a
comprehensive list of experiments.
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3.46%
2.33%
1.23%
2.24%3.64%
4.28%
Fig. 4. Demographic information for the collected datasets. A summary of the collected samples per dataset can be found in Table 3.
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Fig. 5. Images of select PAIs used in the PADISI-USC data collection. More details for each PAI can be found in Table 2.
A summary of the captured data for a single finger is
presented in Table 1. In multiple cases, data is also captured
without active illumination and such images can be used
as reference frames for ambient illumination conditions. We
developed two replicas of our sensor suite each one used
at each collection site (USC and APL). Note that, despite
best efforts, some system adjustments could not be identical
in the two replicas, such as lens shutter adjustments. Also,
despite the closed-box design, ambient light might leak into
the station and partially influence imaging conditions.
3 DATASET
As discussed in Section 1, the PADISI dataset was collected
at two different sites (USC and APL). The data at USC were
collected in two separate sessions, referred to as USC-1 and
USC-2, between which minor adjustments were applied on
the system. During all collections, a participant presented
4 fingers from each hand (excluding little fingers). Each
participant passed once or twice by the collection station
either in the absence of any attack or in the presence of up
to three attached PAIs to the fingers of one or both hands,
while a few participants participated in multiple collection
sessions. At the APL data collection, data was also collected
from all participants using a series of commercial legacy
sensors (see [26] for details). In this work, we chose to
use data from the LScan1000 [84] sensor for comparison
purposes since it has the highest resolution and provided
the most reliable data in terms of match rates (see [26]).
The collected data was thoroughly reviewed by the
research team and samples with defects, e.g., due to finger
motion or hardware failure, were excluded. A summary of
the collected data counts, after these revisions, is provided
in Table 3 while the relevant demographic information is
presented in Fig. 4. As observed, the APL dataset is larger
but exhibits a big imbalance between bona-fide and PAI
6TABLE 2
PAI counts in the collected datasets. For each PAI code, we provide the PAI description, the number of different species per dataset as well as the
attributes used for grouping PAI codes in terms of material, species, transparency, and attack type. PAI categories whose appearance depends
heavily on the participant and preparation method are marked with ∗. A summary of the collected samples per dataset can be found in Table 3.
Grouping AttributesDescription Total Samples
USC APL
Total Species
USC APL
Code
Conductive silicone overlay,
(Nusil R-2631)
Silicone finger, VeroBlackPlus mold
Play-doh finger
Gelatin finger
Silly putty finger
Monster latex finger, dental mold
Dragonskin/Silicone finger, dental mold
Dental material finger, dental mold
Dragonskin/Gelatin finger, wax mold
Wax finger, VeroBlackPlus mold
Silicone finger, conductive coating
2D printed fingerprint (Matte)
2D printed fingerprint (Transparent)
2D printed finger-vein pattern (Matte)
2D printed finger-vein pattern (Glossy)
Silicone overlay, VeroBlackPlus mold
Wax/Glue overlay, VeroBlackPlus mold
Latex/Glue overlay, wax mold
Dragonskin overlay, PCB mold
PDMS or Glue overlay, PCB mold
Two-part silicone overlay
Gelatin overlay
3D printed finger
Urethane overlay, conductive coating
Staples/Band-aid
Conductive silicone overlay,
(Silicone solutions SS-27S)
3D printed finger, Ag coating
Monster latex finger, Au coating
Silicone overlay, yellow pigment
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
180
116
76 50
55
78
550
51
59
74
195
69
49
64
22
37
265 282
314
86
172
100
4
77
18
164
90
77
61
21
48
24
72
98
2
5
4
1 1
3
2
6
1
2
1
5
1
1
1
1
1
7
1
3
1
1 4
1
2
1
1
1
1
3
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
2
1
1
1
Material
Silicone
Dragonskin
Coating
Species
Group1
Group2
Group3
Type
Overlay
Fake finger
Transparency
Semi
Opaque
Transparent
Special case
Only for
APL species
1
1
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
*
*
samples. At the same time, the USC dataset contains a much
larger variety of PAI species. Moreover, there is a huge
discrepancy in demographics especially in terms of age and
race. The USC dataset contains mostly young people of
Asian origin (since it was collected in a university environ-
ment) while the APL dataset exhibits a skewed distribution
toward white people while having a more balanced age
distribution. The discrepancy in the number of participants
and total samples between the APL and APL-LEGACY data
in Table 3 is due to the fact that participants did not always
visit the legacy sensors multiple times due to their slow
speed as well as the data revision process, which was in-
dependently performed per sensor. In this table, we present
only the samples from the legacy sensor that correspond to
participants and fingers available in our prototype data.
TABLE 3
Collected datasets summary. Demographic information can be found
in Fig. 4 while more details about PAIs are provided in Table 2.
PADISI Datasets
USC APL APL-LEGACY
Participants 355 672 665
Unique fingers 2490 5371 5308
Total samples 6211 11444 8850
Bona-fide samples 3596 10359 8043
PAI Samples 2615 1085 807
PAI Species 58 12 12
Snapshots of prepared and collected PAIs are illustrated
in Fig. 5. Analytic information about all PAIs used during
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Fig. 6. RGB visualization of samples from the collected datasets for all types of captured data. For each image, the corresponding dark channel
has been subtracted and each RGB channel has been normalized by dividing by its maximum value for visualization purposes, albeit introducing
visible color artifacts in some cases. Note that, the resolution of the BN data is the same as the FM data but is presented smaller in the illustration.
the data collections are provided in Table 2 where PAIs are
categorized using different codes, each of which can contain
one or more species (e.g., referring to a different color of a
specific material or a slightly different preparation method).
For each PAI code, we have provided a classification scheme
using a set of grouping attributes based on their material,
species, transparency, and attack type. Some of these at-
tributes (e.g., transparency) were selected subjectively based
on the appearance of each PAI and this classification will be-
come important in understanding upcoming results in this
work. Finally, examples of the finger area of the captured
data for a bona-fide sample and select types of PAIs for all
sensing modalities, described in Section 2, are provided in
Fig. 6. In this illustration 3 frames are each time stacked
together to form a false-colored RGB image.
3.1 Mean Intensity Analysis
Based on the appearance of the images in Fig. 6, one might
argue that the average intensities of each spectral channel
of the captured data could be sufficient for obtaining a
reasonable FPAD performance, since the images of bona-
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Fig. 7. t-SNE [85] visualization of average intensities of FM , FS , 10 frames of FL and 3 frames of BN data for all samples in the PADISI datasets.
Visualizations are re-colored to distinguish data from different collections as well as bona-fides from PAIs with different characteristics.
fides and PAIs look drastically different. In order to un-
derstand the characteristics of the captured multi-spectral
data in more detail, we conduct an analysis of the average
intensity of each channel using t-SNE visualizations [85],
where we use all available FM and FS data, 10 frames from
the FL data and 3 frames from the BN data (see Table 1).
The visualizations are presented in Fig. 7 where samples are
re-colored to distinguish bona-fides from specific PAI codes,
bona-fides and PAIs in general, bona-fides and PAIs from
each data collection session as well as bona-fides and PAIs
with the grouping attributes introduced in Table 2. From
the presented 2D distributions, we can make the following
observations:
• PAI codes tend to form individual clusters, support-
ing the use of multi-spectral data for observing the
distinctive response of different PAI materials.
• Bona-fide samples of the USC-1 and USC-2 data
collections appear to have a large separation mainly
due to the adjustments in our system (as discussed
earlier). At the same time, bona-fide samples be-
tween the USC and APL data collections also exhibit
significant separation possibly because of their vastly
different demographics (as shown in Fig. 4).
• It is apparent that a large number of PAIs becomes
separable from bona-fides simply using the aver-
age intensity features, strengthening the power of
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Fig. 8. Proposed FCN network architecture: Given parameter h, an input image of C channels is first converted into a two dimensional score map
(corresponding to a PAD score per patch) from which the final PAD score is extracted by global average pooling.
multi-spectral data for FPAD. However, the analysis
demonstrates that certain PAI types might be par-
ticularly hard to detect, the majority of which are
transparent overlays made of multiple materials.
The presented visualization can also provide an estimate of
how challenging a dataset is and could be used for assigning
weights to PAI codes, based on their distance from the bona-
fide cluster.
4 FULLY-CONVOLUTIONAL NEURAL NETWORK
MODEL
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have repeatedly delivered
breakthroughs in multiple research disciplines. However,
they are notoriously known for being data-hungry: sub-
stantial amounts of data have to be used to avoid over-
fitting during training. Despite the relatively large size of
our dataset, it is still small for effectively training a DNN
model. This problem has been addressed in prior work on
our data in two different ways. In [27], [28], patch-based
models were employed by extracting hundreds of 8 × 8
patches from an input sample and classifying it by taking
the average score over all patches. This approach proved
very effective but has two main drawbacks. First, it in-
volves repeated computations when processing consecutive
patches, which typically overlap. Second, it does not scale
well as the input image size increases, in which case sparse
sampling of patches becomes necessary for the approach
to be feasible. The alternative approach of transfer learning
was used in [42], [53], [78], where a pre-trained network
is fine-tuned on our data instead of trained from scratch.
The main issue with transfer learning is relying on existing
models, which might be too complex for the task at hand.
In this paper, we introduce a novel model for FPAD that
avoids the drawbacks of both the patch-based and transfer
learning-based approaches. Our new model uses an FCN
structure that maps a whole region of interest (ROI) of the
input finger image to a map of classification scores, which
is then averaged to produce the overall classification score
of the input sample. The details of the network structure are
shown in Fig. 8. The network consists of five convolutional
blocks, with a batch-normalization layer after each group
of two-blocks. Starting from a specified number of convo-
lutional maps in the first block (h in Fig. 8), the number
of convolutional maps is doubled in the transition between
each two consecutive blocks. The final block is followed by
a convolutional layer that produces a single map using a
sigmoid activation, which represents the patch-wise clas-
sification score. Note that, there are no explicitly cropped
patches in the FCN model. The patch is an implicit concept
referring to the receptive field of each score map element. The
score map is then fed to a global average pooling (GAP)
layer to produce the final score. Each score map entry is in
the range [0, 1], enforced by the sigmoid activation. Hence,
the final model output also falls in [0, 1].
The resulting PAD score can be interpreted as the proba-
bility of the presence of a PA. Hence, the ground truth score
is set to 1 for PA samples and 0 for bona-fide samples.
The loss function comprises of two components, one for
the final classification score LGAP , and one for the patch
classification score Lpatch, as:
L = LGAP + λLpatch , (1)
where λ > 0. Let the score map associated with an input
image x be M : RC×W×H → RWm×Hm , where C is the
number of channels in x, W × H is the input 2D image
size, and Wm × Hm is the score map size. Considering the
binary cross entropy (BCE) as the loss function, the two loss
components can be expressed as:
LGAP (x) = BCE
 1
WmHm
Wm∑
i
Hm∑
j
Mij(x), t
 , (2)
Lpatch(x) =
1
WmHm
Wm∑
i
Hm∑
j
BCE (Mij(x), t) , (3)
where t ∈ {0, 1} is the ground truth label of the input x.
For all experiments presented in this work, we use
h = 16 and λ = 10, while C is varying depending on the
provided input image channels. Based on these parameters,
the effective patch size (or receptive field) of the model is
an area of 54 × 54 pixels for each score in M . Training
is performed for a maximum of 100 epochs using a batch
size of 16 and the Adam optimizer [86]. The initial learning
rate is set to 2 × 10−4 with a minimum learning rate of
1×10−7 following a reduce-on-plateau by 0.5 strategy (with
patience 10 epochs and threshold 1 × 10−4) by monitoring
the validation loss, when a validation set is available.
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Fig. 9. FPAD evaluation on the sensors of the LivDet2015 dataset [29]. Left: Bar-graph visualization of the evaluation metrics; Right: ROC curves
and analytic values (with best values highlighted in bold). The corresponding accuracies per sensor are presented in Table 4.
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
This section presents the experimental evaluation of this
work. We first study the capabilities of the presented FCN
model on an existing dataset and then run a comprehensive
list of experiments on the presented dataset. The analysis
uses various evaluation protocols on different combinations
of input channels from the collected sensing modalities in
our dataset and compares their performance with legacy
data, whenever appropriate. Before proceeding with the
evaluation, we summarize the data pre-processing steps and
evaluation metrics used in our analysis.
Data Pre-Processing: The data, whether prototype or
legacy, are first pre-processed:
• Prototype Data: From the captured data, summa-
rized in Table 1, we use all frames from the FM
and FS sensing modalities, frames 10 − 19 from the
FL data and frames 10 − 12 from the BN data, in
different combinations. If non-illuminated frames are
available for any spectral channel, the time-averaged
non-illuminated frame is first subtracted. The data
is then normalized in [0, 1] using the corresponding
bit depth (see Table 1). Because of the fixed relative
location of the finger slit in images captured by our
equipment, it was possible to set fixed ROIs for each
sensing modality. The ROI was chosen to cover most
of the area of the top finger knuckle which almost
always consists of skin in bona-fide samples, and PAI
material in PA samples. ROIs of images of different
sensing modalities are all resized to 160×80 pixels
using bicubic interpolation and then stacked to form
the multi-spectral data cube provided to our model.
• Legacy Data: Legacy finger images consist of a single
grayscale image where the finger ridges appear dark.
We detect the finger area by first binarizing the image
using thresholding, applying dilation with a circular
structuring element of diameter 7 pixels and finding
the centroid of the largest connected component in
the resulting binary image. The centroid is used as
the center for extracting an ROI of pre-defined fixed
size, for all images, depending on the average finger
coverage in the images of each legacy sensor.
TABLE 4
FPAD accuracy on the test sets of the LivDet2015 dataset using a
threshold of 0.5. Values of existing algorithms are taken from [29] while
the best performing algorithm is highlighted in bold.
Method GreenBit Hi-Scan Persona CrossMatch Overall
nogueira 95.40 94.36 93.72 98.10 95.51
unina 95.80 95.20 85.44 96.00 93.23
jinglian 94.44 94.08 88.16 94.34 92.82
anonym 92.24 92.92 87.56 96.57 92.51
titanz 91.76 92.36 89.04 91.62 91.21
hbirkholz 91.36 93.40 88.00 89.93 90.64
hectorn 90.00 88.20 84.20 86.94 87.32
CSI MM 86.56 87.84 75.56 89.99 85.20
CSI 82.12 83.20 76.20 88.33 82.71
COPILHA 72.76 75.64 79.96 69.00 74.11
UFPE II 87.68 71.24 75.44 61.16 73.33
UFPE I 82.56 64.32 78.36 59.97 70.82
Proposed 98.56 96.80 94.80 98.10 97.11
Evaluation Metrics: As discussed in Section 4, the
output score of the FCN model in Fig. 8 represents the PA
probability (in [0, 1]) of an input sample. Therefore, using a
threshold of 0.5 is a natural choice for obtaining the FPAD
binary classification and, hence computing the accuracy.
However, any choice of threshold without a specific target
operating point is indeed arbitrary. Hence, we opt to use
metrics that do not depend on a pre-set threshold. In par-
ticular, three metrics are used to compare different models
in our experiments: i) area under the receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curve, denoted as AUC; ii) true positive
rate at 0.2% false positive rate, denoted as TPR0.2%, which
is the primary evaluation metric used in IARPA’s Odin
program [87], through which this research has been spon-
sored; and iii) bona-fide presentation classification error rate
(BPCER) at attack presentation classification error (APCER)
of 5%, denoted as BPCER20 in the ISO standard [88].
5.1 Evaluation on LivDet dataset
We first evaluate the proposed FCN model on the
LivDet2015 dataset [29]. The dataset contains images from 4
legacy sensors, namely, CrossMatch, GreenBit, Hi-Scan and
Digital-Persona from which, following the pre-processing
steps for legacy data, we extracted ROIs of size 320 × 256,
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Fig. 10. 3FOLD FPAD evaluation on the PADISI-USC dataset. Left: Bar-graph visualization of the evaluation metrics (mean for all folds); Right: ROC
curves and analytic values (mean and standard deviation for all folds with best values highlighted in bold).
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Fig. 11. 3FOLD FPAD evaluation on the PADISI-APL dataset and comparison with performance on legacy data (APL-LEGACY from Table 3). Left:
Bar-graph visualization of the evaluation metrics (mean for all folds); Right: ROC curves and analytic values (mean and standard deviation for all
folds with best values highlighted in bold). Legacy-S refers to “small” legacy images, equal in size to the used prototype data passed to the network,
while Legacy-L refers to “large” legacy images, extracted as described in the legacy data pre-processing steps of Section 5.
320 × 256, 600 × 480 and 260 × 200 pixels on the detected
finger area, respectively. Images were also normalized in
[0, 1], based on the bit depth of 8 bits for all sensors.
The LivDet2015 dataset provides pre-defined training and
testing sets for each sensor but no validation set. Therefore,
training was performed for the maximum of 100 epochs
using the training parameters described in Section 4. The
resulting ROC curves and evaluation metrics are depicted in
Fig. 9 while accuracy comparison with other algorithms us-
ing a threshold of 0.5 is summarized in Table 4. As observed,
the proposed model achieves state-of-the-art performance
for all experiments, supporting its power for FPAD.
5.2 Evaluation on PADISI dataset
We now evaluate the performance of the FCN model on the
PADISI dataset. Our analysis uses the pre-processed data
cubes and, following an early-fusion approach, considers
different stacked combinations of FM , FS , FL and BN data
as input channels to our model under a range of evaluation
protocols. Hence for each experiment in each evaluation
protocol, we vary the number of channels C , as presented
in Fig. 8, to consider all possible 15 combinations of the
captured sensing modalities as input data to our model.
5.2.1 Evaluation Protocols
We employ three different evaluation protocols. In the first
strategy, we use a 3-fold (3FOLD) partitioning to alleviate
the bias resulting from a fixed division of the dataset into
training, testing, and validation sets. In this strategy, sam-
ples of a collection are divided into three roughly-equal sets
of samples such that data of each participant only appears
in a single set. Then, 3FOLD cross-validation evaluation
is done by performing three experiments, each time using
two sets for training and validation, and the left-out set
for testing. Each time, from the training/validation group,
80% of data is used for training and 20% for validation,
while making sure all training/testing/validation sets are
participant-disjoint. It is also important to note that in all
splits, the distribution of bona-fide and different PAI cate-
gory samples are approximately balanced among the train-
ing/testing/validation sets. The 3FOLD partitioning is con-
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Fig. 12. LOO FPAD evaluation on the PADISI-USC dataset. Left: Bar-graph visualization of the evaluation metrics (mean for all LOO categories);
Right: ROC curves and analytic values (mean and standard deviation for all LOO categories with best values highlighted in bold). See Table 5 for
analytic results.
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Fig. 13. Inter-site FPAD evaluation on the PADISI dataset (training on USC data and testing on APL data). Left: Bar-graph visualization of the
evaluation metrics; Right: ROC curves and analytic values (with best values highlighted in bold).
sidered for intra-collection evaluations, which are applied
either to the PADISI-USC or the PADISI-APL collections.
As a second partitioning strategy, we use a leave-one-
attack-out (LOO) protocol, in order to evaluate the ability
to detect unknown attacks (i.e., attacks not present in the
training data). Using the PAI grouping attributes of Table
2, we create a partition for each color (excluding the special
case), leading to 11 partitions for the PADISI-USC collection.
As mentioned in Sections 2 and 3, the sensor parameters,
environmental settings as well as the demographics for
PADISI were not identical in the two collection sites (USC
and APL). To study the effect of these variations to the
FPAD classification performance, we also perform inter-site
evaluation for which PADISI-USC is used for training and
validation, and PADISI-APL is used for testing.
FPAD classification performance is evaluated, per fold,
for each of the settings and for all aforementioned metrics.
The mean and standard deviation of each metric is com-
puted over the total number of the folds for each parti-
tioning strategy. In the following sections, we provide an
analysis of our results under the different scenarios.
5.2.2 Evaluation Results
• 3FOLD evaluation: The 3FOLD evaluation results for
the PADISI-USC dataset are presented in Fig. 10 and
for the PADISI-APL in Fig. 11. For the PADISI-APL
dataset, a comparison to the performance using the
legacy data of the LScan1000 sensor is presented
using two different pre-processing methods. Legacy-
S refers to ROIs of 160×80 pixels, equal in size to our
prototype data, while Legacy-L refers to larger ROIs
of size 480×384 following the general pre-processing
steps for legacy data described earlier. Even though
the total number of samples for the APL-LEGACY
data is not equal to our prototype data; the folds were
consistent by using the same participant’s samples as
in the 3FOLD partitions described in Section 5.2.1.
• PADISI-USC LOO evaluation: The average perfor-
mance on all 11 LOO partitions of the PADISI-USC
dataset is presented in Fig. 12 while analytic results
for each partition are summarized in Table 5.
• Inter-site evaluation: The inter-site evaluation results
are depicted in Fig. 13.
13
TABLE 5
Analytic LOO FPAD evaluation, per LOO category, on the PADISI-USC dataset. Left: Bar-graph visualization of the TPR0.2% metric; Right:
Analytic values (with best values highlighted in bold). The corresponding average LOO results are presented in Fig. 12.
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0.985 0.0001.000
0.975 0.0000.999
0.977 0.0001.000
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5.2.3 Discussion
Based on the results of Section 5.2.2 we can make the
following observations:
• Some of the studied sensing modalities (particularly
FM and FS) can achieve very high FPAD perfor-
mance with FS being less affected by cross-dataset
variations (as seen in Fig. 11), which is consistent
with the relevant literature on SWIR imaging.
• With the exception of FL or BN data alone, any
other single sensing modality or combination proves
superior to legacy data (see Fig. 11), especially at very
low false positive rates.
• In the majority of the cases, combining more than
14
one sensing modalities leads to improved perfor-
mance. This is particularly apparent in the unknown
attack scenario where most models employing two
or more sensing modalities consistently outperform
the single ones for most metrics (see Table 5). This
observation supports the use of multi-spectral data
for FPAD and the power of hybrid methods.
• In multiple cases, increasing the number of channels
provided to the model does not always lead to per-
formance improvement, albeit not with significant
loss. Such behavior may signify overfitting or non-
optimal weighting of certain channels toward the
final classification output and could open new re-
search directions for incorporating channel attention
techniques to our model [89], [90], [91].
Extending the t-SNE visualization analysis of Section 3, we
compare the separation in t-SNE space between the features
extracted by the FCN model (score maps) to the correspond-
ing mean-intensity features, for select experiments, in Fig.
14. The illustrations include results for 1 fold of the 3FOLD
evaluation protocol on the PADISI-USC collection and the
inter-site evaluation protocol. The figure presents the two
worst results on the left, the medial result in the middle and
the best two results on the right for each evaluation protocol
by using the equal error rate (EER) threshold to calculate the
accuracy of each experiment. The visualization marks the
misclassified bona-fide and PAI samples based on the EER
threshold and shows the corresponding locations of these
samples in the mean-intensity feature visualization. Finally,
the codes of the misclassified PAIs are presented in the
legends. This analysis results in the following observations:
• The addition of sensing modalities leads to perfor-
mance improvement, in most cases (compare right-
most to leftmost input channels), consistent with the
ROC curve observations.
• The mean-intensity feature visualization indeed pro-
vides an estimate of how challenging a dataset is.
The majority of misclassified PAIs by the FCN model
are in most cases within the bona-fide cluster of the
mean-intensity t-SNE visualization. This dictates that
intensities of multi-spectral data could be playing an
important role as classification features in the model.
• The majority of misclassified bona-fides lie at the
border of the bona-fide cluster in the mean-intensity
feature visualization, which further supports the
aforementioned argument (this is mostly visible in
the inter-site experiment).
• The misclassified PAI codes for the rightmost highest
accuracy experiments agree with the analysis of Fig.
7, which demonstrated that the most challenging
PAIs are the transparent overlays (see Table 2).
• The left-most experiments also demonstrate the abil-
ity of deep features to achieve a reasonable classifi-
cation performance even when large amounts of in-
tensity features are intermingled for the two classes.
• Finally, the inter-site analysis clearly shows a shift in
the EER threshold resulting from the vastly different
demographics and collection system variations for
the two datasets. This is consistent with the mean-
intensity t-SNE separation of bona-fide samples from
different datasets in Fig. 7.
6 CONCLUSIONS
This paper presented a comprehensive analysis of hybrid
(hardware-based) FPAD, using a number of recently intro-
duced sensing modalities, which are front-illuminated visi-
ble, NIR, and SWIR images; back-illuminated NIR images,
and laser-speckle contrast imaging. The analysis was con-
ducted on a new dataset, named PADISI-Finger. PADISI-
Finger consists of two collections performed at two different
sites, PADISI-USC and PADISI-APL, the former of which will
be publicly released upon the acceptance of this manuscript.
PADISI-Finger contains data from over a thousand partici-
pants and covers more than 60 PAI species. Our analysis em-
ployed a novel fully-convolutional network model, whose
power was demonstrated by showing its state-of-the-art
performance on the LivDet2015 dataset. FPAD performance
using this FCN model revealed the advantages of some of
the individual unconventional sensing modalities and all
different combinations of them over legacy data. The power
of combining multiple sensing modalities was further con-
firmed by the results of our rigorous evaluation protocols,
which assessed the effects of testing on completely unseen
attack categories (leave-one-attack out) as well as under
different dataset characteristics (inter-collection). In such
challenging protocols, front-illuminated multi-spectral im-
ages (visible, NIR, and SWIR) stood out as the most reliable
sensing modalities, either individually or in combination
with others. Low-dimensional data visualization of the raw
average intensity values revealed a notable similarity to the
equivalent visualization of the features learned by the FCN
model, which upholds the role of the data in the obtained
FPAD performance in our analysis. Finally, it was observed
that the FPAD performance is not directly correlated with
the number of employed sensing modalities. This is believed
to be an artifact of the neural network model architecture,
and its investigation is deferred to our future work.
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Fig. 14. t-SNE visualization comparison for deep features (score maps) of the FCN model in Fig. 8 and the corresponding mean-intensity features
of the utilized input channels. Each experiment presents the classification accuracy based on the EER threshold, the misclassified samples of the
FCN model in both visualizations and the codes of misclassified PAIs in the legend. Experiments are sorted by their accuracy from left to right. The
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